The traditional notions of strong and weak normalization refer to properties of a binary reduction relation. In this paper we explore an alternative approach to normalization, where we bypass the reduction relation and instead focus on the normalization function, that is, the function which maps a term into its normal form. We work in an intuitionistic metalanguage, and characterize a normalization function as an algorithm which picks a canonical representative from the equivalence class of convertible terms. Hence we also get a decision algorithm for convertibility.
Introduction
There is a striking analogy between computing a program and assigning semantics to it. This analogy is for instance re ected in the similarity between the equations de ning the denotational semantics of a language and the rules of evaluation in an environment machine 16, 28, 21] .
In this paper we use this analogy to give a semantical treatment of normalization by building a nonstandard model, and a function quote which maps a semantic object to a normal term representing it. The normalization function nf is then obtained by composing quote with the interpretation function ] ], which maps a term into its non-standard meaning. This approach to normalization bypasses the binary reduction relation and its traditional properties of strong and weak normalization and ChurchRosser. Instead of these properties we shall use that a term is convertible to the term returned by the normalization function a conv nf a and that the normalization function maps convertible terms to equal terms a conv a 0 ! nf a = nf a 0
It follows that the normalization function picks a representative (a normal form) from each equivalence class of convertible terms a conv a 0 $ nf a = nf a 0 and hence can be used to decide convertibility by comparing normal forms. Note that this notion of normal form does not refer to a reduction relation and is not necessarily a normal form in the traditional sense.
Our starting point was the reading of two early papers by Martin-L of, where he introduced this approach in the context of a general discussion of intuitionistic abstractions on the meta level and the notion of de nitional equality 18]. He also proved normalization for intuitionistic type theory 19] in this way. While analyzing these ideas, we realized that there was a close connection to the work by Berger and Schwichtenberg 5] . They showed how to get a normalization algorithm (returning long normal forms) for the simply typed -calculus by inverting an interpretation function.
Here we develop this approach for a small functional programming language based on typed combinatory logic. First we study a combinatory version of G odel System T in section 2. We give its syntax and standard semantics. Then we show how to derive a normalization algorithm by enriching the standard semantics of function types with a syntactic component, which keeps track of normal forms. We then show how to prove that this algorithm yields a decision algorithm for equality by constructing a glueing model, similar to the model used by Lafont 14] in his work on deriving the categorical abstract machine from a proof of termination for a categorical combinator language. Furthermore we show how metamathematical properties, such as consistency and that constructors are one-to-one can be derived. Finally, we show how our glueing construction can be modi ed to give a proof of weak normalization in the traditional sense and how Church-Rosser then follows as a corollary.
In section 3 we show how our method extends in a straightforward way when nite disjoint unions and cartesian products are added to the language. By the Curry-Howard identi cation of proposition and types we thus get a model-based proof of normalization for full intuitionistic propositional logic.
In section 4 we show how to extend our method to trans nite inductive types by giving the example of Brouwer ordinals.
It was essential to us (and to Martin-L of 18]) to think in terms of an intuitionistic metalanguage when developing these ideas. We also wished to show in detail that Martin-L of's intuitionistic type theory was adequate as a formal metalanguage for this task and implemented our constructions using ALF { an implementation of Martin-L of type theory 1]. In section 5 we discuss issues which relate speci cally to the metalanguage and its implementation. Following suggestions from the referees we have rewritten section 2-4, which were originally derived from a formal ALF-development, in a more informal style to make them accessible to readers unfamiliar with Martin-L of type theory.
In section 6 we discuss related work.
2 G odel System T We shall use polymorphic notation whenever appropriate for improving readability. For example, we write K; S; app(c; a); rec(d; e) for K(A; B); S(A; B; C); app(A; B; c; a); and rec(C; d; e) respectively.
Note that we directly generate the well-typed terms of each type. This is di erent from the traditional approach, where one rst introduces a set of raw terms and then de nes a binary typing relation between raw terms and types. We discuss this point further in section 6.1.
Intended semantics
In the intended semantics we interpret a type A as a We work in the intuitionistic metalanguage of Martin-L of type theory, and our intended semantics can thus be viewed as an intuitionistic version of the standard (Tarski) set-theoretic semantics of G odel System T. However, the reader who prefers to look at metalanguage expressions as in informal mathematics or as in formal set theory should have no problem, since Martin-L of type theory has a straightforward \naive" set-theoretic semantic 11].
We point out that there is a close parallel between object language expressions (of G odel System T) and metalanguage notations used for their interpretation. We use the convention that object language expressions are written in teletype and metalanguage expressions in italic. Moreover, we have arbitrarily chosen to use logical symbols in the object language (); ?; >; _;^) and type forming symbols in the metalanguage (!; ;; 1; +; ).
For example, the set N of natural numbers in the metalanguage are generated inductively by 0 and s. We have a metalanguage primitive recursion operator Proof. By induction on the proof that a conv a 0 .
2
Corollary 2 G odel System T is equationally consistent, that is, it has no derivation of 0 conv s(0). Proof. If we assume 0 conv s(0), then we can prove 0 = 1 { a contradiction.
2 However, to prove for example that the constructor s is one-to-one for convertibility we need the normalization proof.
Normalization algorithm
The interpretation function into the intended model is not injective and hence cannot be inverted. (The intended model is a -algebra and all combinatory algebras are not -algebras. So there are terms which are identi ed in the model but not by convertibility, see Barendregt 3] Proof. We use initial algebra semantics to structure our proof. A model of G odel System T is a typed combinatory algebra extended with operations for interpreting 0, s, and rec, such that the two equations for primitive recursion are satis ed. The syntactic algebra of terms T(A) under convertibility conv A is an initial model. The non-standard model described in 2.3 is another model. The Freyd cover is the special case of where S is the category of sets and TA = C(1; A).
We have chosen notation to suggest the connection between our model of glued values for combinatory logic and the glueing construction: the commuting square in the de nition of arrow in the glued category is reminiscent of the the de nition of glued value for a function type.
Weak normalization revisited
We end this section by reintroducing the relation red of reduction (in zero or more steps) and point out that the normalization proof in our sense can easily be modi ed to a proof of weak normalization in the traditional sense. We modify our glueing model so that instead 
Syntax
We now extend our object language with nite disjoint unions and nite cartesian products, so that we get full intuitionistic propositional calculus by the Curry-Howard identi cation of propositions and types.
The There are also new term constructors corresponding to the introduction and elimination rules for propositional calculus As before, we adopt polymorphic notation for these constants; for instance inl 
Normalization algorithm
We can extend the non-standard model in 2.3, which can be used for normalization, by interpreting the new type formers as in the intended semantics.
We also extend the de nition of quote:
quote > hi = <> quote A_B (inl p) = inl(quote A p) quote A_B (inr q) = inr(quote B q) quote A^B hp; qi = <quote A p; quote B q>
We also need to extend the interpretation function for terms in the enriched model (we omit cases which are the same as for the intended interpretation It follows that we have a recursion operator for O M : The normalization proof in 2.5 extends.
5 Constructors are one-to-one 2 The usual way of proving the fact that constructors are one-to-one for conversion is to rely on the Church-Rosser's property. 6 The role of an intuitionistic metalanguage Why do we emphasize that we work in an intuitionistic metalanguage? The reason is of course conceptual rather than formal. Indeed, we have presented the technical development in an informal mathematical style readily understandable from a classical as well as an intuitionistic point of view.
The most fundamental fact is that intuitionistically a function is the same as an algorithm, so a normalization function is as good as step-by-step-reduction for representing a mechanical procedure. Furthermore, intuitionistically a proof that each term has a normal form is a function which given a term returns a normal term (and a proof that the returned term is a normal form). This is one way of deriving a normalization function: by extracting the computational content of a normalization proof. This is based on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-interpretation of proofs in intuitionistic logic and of the Curry-Howard isomorphism between propositions and types.
The reader is referred to Martin-L of 18] for further discussion of the role of the intuitionistic metalanguage. We started our investigations while trying to answer the question: what is an elegant approach to normalization provided Martin-L of's intuitionistic type theory is used as a metalanguage? We also wished to experiment with computer-assisted proofs using the proof assistant ALF 1] for intuitionstic type theory and hoped that formalization would throw light on for example the following statement 18]:
The transition to intuitionistic abstractions on the metalevel is both essential and nontrivial. Essential, because in what seems to me to be the most fruitful notion of model, the interpretation of the convertibility relation conv, is standard, that is, it is interpreted as de nitional equality = def in the model, and de nitional equality is a notion which is unmentionable within the classical set theoretic framework. Below we shall discuss some aspects of the formalization which were speci cally guided by the structure of Martin-L of type theory: the representation of syntax, di erent notions of equality, and the representation of algebraic notions in type theory.
The reader is referred to the following books and papers on Martin-L of type theory: Martin-L of 20] and Nordstr om, Petersson, and Smith 25] for general information, Dybjer 12] on inductive de nitions in type theory, and to Coquand 7] on de nition by pattern-matching in type theory. 13] , and then to introduce a typing relation t A between raw terms t 2 Raw and types A 2 Type: It is direct to de ne a map strip A 2 T(A) ! Raw which strips a typed term from its type decorations. The following proposition is then proved by induction:
Proposition 13 If a 2 T(A); then strip a A: Furthermore, if a 0 2 T(A) and a conv A a 0 ; then strip a conv strip a 0 :
This alternative presentation with raw terms is actually the one we have used informally, when choosing a polymorphic notation to represent our terms. A natural question is then: if we use a raw expression t to represent an expression of a given type a 2 T(A); are we sure that this expression does represent such a term in an unambiguous way? It is rst easy to prove by induction: Proposition 14 If t 2 Raw is such that t A; then there exists a 2 T(A) such that strip a = t:
The problem now is that, for a given t A; there can be several such term a that corresponds to t: For instance K 0 I is a term of type N which has several possible type decorations. This is a typical coherence problem, needed in general to justify an overloaded notation. The following proposition solves this coherence problem, but only for the pure system of typed combinators without rec: Proposition 15 If a; a 0 2 T(A) are such that strip a = strip a 0 ; then a conv A a 0 :
Proof: We don't know any direct proof of this proposition. The following indirect argument is due to Streicher 29] . First, we prove unicity of a typed decoration of a raw term t A for t in normal form. The proposition results then from the normalisation theorem and the fact that strip preserves conversion. 2 This proposition does not hold for the system with rec: Indeed, it is then possible to exhibit raw terms that have non convertible decorations, as shown by Salvesen 27] . It is thus important to work with decorated terms in this case.
On equality in the metalanguage
The quotation 18] in the introduction of this section argues that in an intuitionistic notion of model it is most fruitful to interpret equality (conversion) in the object language as de nitional equality in the model. This requirement is satis ed for our formalized models. Both the intended model in 2. The metalanguage expressions on both sides have the same normal form. As a consequence, the ALFproofs that equality in the object language is mapped to equality in the metalanguage (theorems 1 and 3) are essentially done automatically by ALF's normalization procedure.
However, when we represent the fact that the interpretation function maps equal terms in the object language to equal elements in the model as a formal proposition in type theory, we have to replace de nitional equality by`intensional' propositional equality I:
A : Type; x : T(A); x 0 : T(A); x conv x 0`I (x; x 0 ) The proof of this proposition is by induction on the proof of a conv a 0 and is almost immediately mechanizable, since each case of the induction is immediately reduced to a proof of re exivity by ALF's normalization.
However, it is not the case that the judgement A : Type; x : T(A); x 0 : T(A); x conv x 0`x = x 0 about de nitional equality is valid, since x and x 0 are di erent normal forms.
Representing algebraic notions in type theory
When representing an algebraic structure in type theory it is often the case that the appropriate notion of carrier is not that of a set but a set with an equivalence relation. For example, a monoid in type theory is given by a set M, an equivalence relation E, a unit element e, and a multiplication operation respecting the equivalence relation E, together with proofs that is associative (with respect to E) and that e is a left and right unit of (with respect to E).
Similarly,a typed combinatory algebra in type theory is given by a familyof sets M(A) with equivalence relations E(A) indexed by types A; families of elements indexed by types K M (A; B) and S M (A; B; C) and an application operation app M (A; B) respecting the equivalence relation; together with proofs of the combinatory axioms (formulated with respect to the equivalence relation).
Algebraic structures can be formalized as contexts in type theory 9, 21] , that is, as lists of variables and types of the form x 1 : 1 ; : : :; x n : n ]. We have dependent types so that a type of a variable may depend on earlier variables. The notion of a typed combinatory algebra can hence be formalized as g; a) ; app M (f; a)))] Here we have used the type-theoretic notation for dependent function types: (x : ) x] is the set of functions f which maps an object a : to an object f(a) : a]. Set is the type of sets in the type-theoretic sense, so (A : Type)Set is the type of Type-indexed families of sets.
Typed combinatory algebras where E is propositional identity I are especially interesting and simple. We call them strict to suggest that a distinction reminiscent of that between a strict and non-strict notion in category theory. In the context formalizing the notion of a strict combinatory algebra we can omit several components:
M g; a) ; app M (f; a)))] A particular instance of an algebraic notion (a particular monoid, a particular typed combinatory algebra, etc.) can be formalized as an explicit substitution, that is, as an assignment fx 1 := a 1 ; : : :x n := a n g of constants to variables in the appropriate context. Furthermore, we can formally de ne and instantiate the notions of homomorphism of models and of an initial model inside type theory. In particular we can build the glued model of section 2.5. Note also that this construction can be performed on any model, and not only the term model. In this way we can de ne abstractly the normalization function over any initial algebra.
7 Related work Lafont 14] used glueing for proving termination and coherence theorems for categorical combinators. These results were then used to derive the evaluation mechanism of the categorical abstract machine. There is a close connection between his construction and our glueing construction (and the term \quote" is Lafont's). The fundamental di erence between his work and ours is in our application to normalization and its corollaries. The di erence in attitude and goals can be illustrated by the following remark, where he argues that the semantic component of his interpretation cannot directly be used for computing:`Mais les valeurs abstraites de A ! B, avec leur composante fonctionelle, ne semblent gu ere \mechanisable" ' 14] page 18]. In contrast to this, we make use of the fact that these abstract values, when represented in our intuitionistic metalanguage, are indeed mechanizable. But, of course, the implementation of this metalanguage may still make use of an environment machine.
It is interesting to compare this situation with the following comments 17]:`Of course, the fact that there is a not necessarily mechanical procedure for computing every function in the present theory of types does not require any proof at all for us, intelligent beings, who can understand the meaning of the types and the terms and recognize that the axioms and rules of inference of the theory are consonant with the intuitionistic notion of function according to which a function is the same as a rule or method. ' Related to this discussion is the following question: what kind of strategy (call-by-value, call-byname, etc.) does the normalization algorithm extracted from these semantical arguments follow? The answer is simple: it is exactly the strategy used at the meta-level.
The technique in this paper can easily be generalized to typed -calculus with weak reduction, where no reduction under is allowed. For details we refer to the preliminary version of the present paper 8].
Berger and Schwichtenberg 5] showed how to obtain an algorithm which returns long -normal forms for simply typed -calculus by inverting an interpretation function into the standard model. Berger 4] also showed how this function can be obtained from a standard normalization proof by using a modi ed realizability model for program extraction.
Catarina Coquand 6] constructed a similar algorithm which returns long -normal forms for a version of the simply typed -calculus. Her approach is more algebraic than Berger and Schwichtenberg's. Another di erence is that she inverts the interpretation function into a Kripke model. This proof has also been given a categorical reconstruction by Altenkirch, Hofmann, and Streicher 2] .
Similar techniques as ours have also been considered for other purposes than normalization. Pfenning and Lee 26] considered a notion of metacircularity for the polymorphic -calculus and de ned aǹ approximately metacircular interpreter' similar to our`intended semantics'. Mogensen 24] considered similar notions for the untyped -calculus intended to be used as a foundation for partial evaluation. He de ned a self-interpreter similar to our intended semantics and a self-reducer similar to our normalizer. Both these papers use higher-order abstract syntax for representing -terms, whereas we use a concrete representation. A related use of glueing is de Vrijer's 10] method for getting an exact estimate of the height of the reduction tree of a term.
